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## **STRATEGIC STUDY ON BIOTERRORISM**

### **Executive Summary**

Dangerous pathogens and toxins are odorless, colorless, and tasteless, and they know no borders. Bioagents are readily available in the modern world and are relatively inexpensive to produce, store and transport from one country to another. Yet they can be toxic, transmissible and lethal. Many view the potential threat of bioterrorism as a growing one, due to the advances in biotechnology, the increased availability of dual-use materials and the ease of transporting biological agents across borders. Compared to the resources spent on nuclear and chemical terrorism, relatively little is being done to fight this threat. Only 1.5 percent of the \$20 billion that the G8 Global Partnership agreed to spend on reducing the risk of weapons or materials of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists has been devoted to bio-related programs. Thus the upcoming G8 Summit in St. Petersburg presents a unique opportunity for the Russian President to take initiatives on this vital issue.

This Strategic Study on Bioterrorism was conducted to increase the awareness of the threat of bioterror and to identify means by which States can prevent and respond to such threats to increase their biosecurity. It addressed bio-threat and response scenarios, risk assessment, modern diagnostic techniques and methods to strengthen capabilities for early detection, surveillance and response to natural and bioterror disease outbreaks, the technical issues to be solved and political, social and psychological aspects of bioterrorism. The Group recommended that in order to prevent dangerous microorganisms from falling into the hands of terrorists, it is essential to secure and consolidate them in certified facilities or destroy them. This can be achieved through bilateral arrangements or through the G8 Global Partnership. In addition, the Group agreed that because the first alarm of a bio-attack will probably be sick patients in the hospital, it is critical to enhance the early detection of microorganisms in the environment and the rapid diagnosis of patients. European countries (such as France, Germany, Switzerland, Sweden and the United Kingdom) that have substantial biotechnology industries and experience working on biodefense and with infectious diseases could work with the Russian Federation to increase security and accounting of pathogen collections, and to strengthen export control restrictions.<sup>1</sup>

Participants in the study included 20 high level bio-experts from the Russian Federation and other European countries who provided their extensive expertise upon which the study is based. Although they came from diverse professional and cultural backgrounds, the resulting collaboration provided a greater understanding of the mutual threat posed by natural and man-made diseases as well as concrete recommendations for future activities. The experts established a dialogue on bioterror as a basis for sharing knowledge, identifying future areas of cooperation and creating mutual confidence on a sensitive subject. A crucial element in building such confidence would be to develop common standards on biosafety and biosecurity.

<sup>1</sup> *Protecting Against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons: An Action Agenda for the Global Partnership*, CSIS Press, Vol. 1, Jan. 2003, p. 27-28

(For the complete study, please click link below.)

<http://www.sgpproject.org/bio%20studyreport14June06.pdf>

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U.S. Department of State

## **Identification, Characterization, and Attribution of Biological Weapons Use**

**Paula A. DeSutter, Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation**

Remarks at the Kings College London Centre for Science and Security Studies  
London, United Kingdom

July 12, 2006

### **I. Introduction**

I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak to you today about a topic of great interest to myself, Under Secretary of State Joseph, Secretary Rice, and the President: the challenges associated with investigating allegations of biological weapons use, identifying agents, and making an attribution assessment.

### **II. VCI**

As Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation (VCI), I am responsible for taking the lead role within the U.S. Government in determining states' compliance under a variety of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament treaties, agreements, and commitments. This includes, most prominently, preparing the President's congressionally mandated annual report to Congress on "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments", commonly called the "Noncompliance Report." The report lays out findings of the United States regarding questions of noncompliance by other nations, alerting the U.S. Government and public to both existing noncompliance and potential compliance concerns. The report, the unclassified version of which is available to all interested parties on the State Department's website, provides in as much detail as possible the evidence and reasoning behind our compliance judgments.

Specific to biological weapons (BW), the Verification, Compliance, and Implementation Bureau has three primary responsibilities. First, we are responsible for assessing other nations' compliance with the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Second, we are designated by law as the Principal Policy Liaison to the U.S. Intelligence Community for verification and compliance matters, and thus work closely with the Intelligence Community to see that the United States Government maximizes the quality and timeliness of information relevant to the development, procurement and use of biological agents for offensive purposes. Third, we

are responsible for assessing and maximizing the verifiability of agreements or commitments in force or under consideration.

Finally, under the United States National Response Plan, which is a document designed to establish a comprehensive all-hazards approach to enhance the ability of the U.S. to manage emergencies, terrorist events and other incidents, VCI is designated as the U.S. Government lead for foreign coordination of attribution assessments, and will collaborate with law enforcement agencies to determine and verify the origin, sponsorship, source, delivery and responsible party for any BW use event that may constitute a violation of international laws, agreements and treaties.

### **III. BW Office**

I, along with my colleagues at the Department of State, am so concerned about the threat of biological weapons that I very recently created a new office within the Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation focused exclusively on Biological Weapons Affairs. This office works closely with other offices in the Department of State that address related issues, including the WMD Terrorism and Chemical and Biological Threat Reduction offices in the International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau and the International Health Affairs Office of the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.

The new Office of Biological Weapons Affairs enables our experts to come together to recognize, understand, and react to the BW threat. We have experts: in biology, biodefense and biosecurity, epidemiology, intelligence analysis, and the Biological Weapons Convention -- all in an office of less than ten people. This office reaches across the depth and breadth of the U.S. Government to bring in all the expertise available to the table regarding BW attribution, working together with the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Defense, and various organizations within the Intelligence Community. We also work hard to reach out to biological weapons experts in academia and private industry who are actively engaged in activities that we hope will improve our ability to perform accurate and rapid attribution assessments. We do this out of our recognition that the only way to address the problem of BW attribution is to leverage and share information as much as possible and to work with all appropriate agencies and experts to coordinate resources and address gaps. Our effort is small, but purposeful.

### **IV. Attribution**

In the concept paper for this conference and research project, organizers wrote, "the use of biological warfare agents by states or terrorists is one of the world's most frightening security threats." I couldn't agree more. Moreover, I am deeply concerned about the difficulties inherent in accurately identifying and making an attribution assessment of BW use.

The Verification, Compliance, and Implementation Bureau has been working intensely over the past many months on developing an attribution handbook- a combined standard operating procedure and directory on how to begin to gather data necessary to seek further investigation. We are also creating a technology matrix and database of available and developing technologies that can target the BW use problem as well as other issues. We hope to identify and encourage detection methods that will give us the answers in a timely fashion and then ensure that a robust and rigorous investigation is conducted.

We understand, though, that the United States cannot do this alone, and we will work to ensure that the international community can come together around this important topic. Because of this, we want to understand what other nations, NGOs and multilateral organizations can contribute to reporting and investigating allegations of BW use. How can the U.S. and the world collect important data that can be used to identify whether a biological weapon has been used, and if so, what State or organization is responsible? What are the most timely, rigorous and credible means to rapidly collect, evaluate and share data necessary to accurately assess whether biological weapons have been used, to contain the spread of disease if necessary and to make an attribution assessment? My guess is that the circumstances of use allegations and the situation on the ground, where use may take place, are varied enough that there is no one-size-fits-all answer. Rather, we need to consider a multi-layered approach. And we need to arm ourselves with the best tools possible so that we are able to respond to whatever situation we are presented with. We will need data to request an investigation. Since the alleged use may be in an area of existing conflict, reporting and perhaps even initial screening could come from the NGO community. We should assist their efforts by identifying what data would be most actionable by the international community.

One tool for multilateral investigations is through the existing United Nations mechanism, whereby any member state can bring allegations of BW use to the Secretary General and request that the UN initiate an investigation using personnel drawn from a UN maintained list of experts. Historically, the upside to utilizing a UN investigation has been international buy-in to the results of the investigation. Downsides, however, have included problems with timeliness and political interference.

Another possible tool drawing on the UN would be to turn to the World Health Organization to coordinate an investigation, drawing on its Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network, or GOARN. The GOARN investigates,

responds to, and works to contain disease outbreaks, as well as other public health events, and operates as part of the WHO's overall work to strengthen global health security.

Yet another tool would be to work with regional entities, such as NATO, which has a multinational CBRN defense battalion that can provide response teams, laboratory assets and logistical support to lead or support missions investigating allegations of BW use.

We should also ask of ourselves and each other what national means and methods exist that can contribute to all of these multilateral tools. We must all work together to identify the resources and tools that exist for BW use investigations and to encourage development of resources that are still desired. One of the areas we are lacking is in the collection and analysis of baseline data to understand when events have occurred and how to trace them. We need reliable, global information and communication about disease patterns or unusual outbreaks that could signal a bioterrorist attack or bioweapons release, creating a baseline epidemiological picture to enable the world to better protect against the deliberate use of biological pathogens as weapons. We especially need a database of global isolates and strains to enable the tracing of agents used in a BW event to specific regions of the world. And to make all of this happen, both at a national and international level, we need to work together to address these issues realistically.

#### **V. Conclusion**

I applaud the efforts of this conference and research project, and appreciate the leadership of the Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Contemporary Conflict and King's College London on this very important endeavor. I look forward to hearing your thoughts throughout the conference and hope these proceedings are productive and balanced.

Thank you.

Released on July 21, 2006

<http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rm/69313.htm>

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Los Angeles Times

August 2, 2006

## **Iran Rejects Deadline To End Nuclear Work**

By Associated Press

TEHRAN — President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad rejected a U.N. Security Council deadline for Iran to suspend uranium enrichment, saying Tuesday that his country would not be pressured into stopping its nuclear program.

"If some think they can still speak with threatening language to the Iranian nation, they must know that they are badly mistaken," Ahmadinejad said in a televised speech.

The Security Council passed a resolution Monday calling for Iran to suspend uranium enrichment by Aug. 31 or face the threat of economic and diplomatic sanctions.

The U.S. has accused Iran of seeking nuclear weapons, though Tehran maintains its program is aimed at generating electricity.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi said the U.N. resolution had no legal foundation.

"It only pursues the political objectives of some countries," Asefi said in a statement.

Iran's ambassador to the U.N. rejected the resolution Monday, saying it would make negotiations more difficult on a Western incentives package offered to Iran in June in exchange for suspending enrichment.

Japan and Russia on Tuesday urged Iran to comply with the resolution. "We call on Iran to listen to the opinion of world society," a Russian Foreign Ministry statement said.

Because of Russian and Chinese demands, officials said, the Security Council resolution was changed from earlier drafts that would have made the threat of sanctions immediate. The resolution will require further council discussion before sanctions are considered.

The resolution passed 14 to 1, with the Persian Gulf nation of Qatar dissenting.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-iran2aug02,0,5775520.story?coll=la-home-world>

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New York Times

August 2, 2006

## **Call To Enrich Uranium In Australia Stirs Debate**

By Raymond Bonner

JAKARTA, Indonesia, Aug. 1 — At a time when the United States wants to reduce the amount of nuclear material washing around the world, one of Washington's major allies, Australia, is on the verge of expanding its production and export of uranium.

The Australian prime minister, John Howard, one of President Bush's staunchest allies, says the country should also begin enriching uranium, a move directly counter to Mr. Bush's call for the uranium enrichment club to be limited to the handful of countries that already have the capacity.

Mr. Howard, leader of the center-right Liberal Party, says he does not see his country as confronting Washington, but as pursuing its best economic interests.

For Australia not to reap greater income from its vast uranium deposits would be akin to Saudi Arabia not exploiting its oil, Mr. Howard said in a major speech recently on the country's energy policy.

He said he had not informed Mr. Bush of his nuclear policies. "I don't need to talk to the U.S. president every day about everything that pops up," said Mr. Howard, who has been criticized by some Australians for talking — and listening — to Mr. Bush too often. "I mean, he's running his own country, and I'm prime minister of Australia."

The Bush administration has remained silent about Mr. Howard's proposals. "We've made no official statement on the issue," a press aide at the American Embassy in Canberra said Tuesday in response to a request for a comment. At home, Mr. Howard's nuclear proposals have set off a spirited debate, marked by a dramatic U-turn on uranium mining by the leader of the opposition liberal Labor Party.

For his part, Mr. Howard says Australia has the largest reserves of uranium in the world, and it does not make good economic sense not to enrich uranium. Such a policy is reminiscent of what he called "one of the great historical anomalies of the Australian economy."

A few decades ago, sheep were the backbone of the Australian economy, and most of their wool was exported.

"We had the best wool in the world and we sent it overseas to be processed and we bought it back at a much higher price," Mr. Howard said. "That always struck people as rather odd. I would be keen to avoid that again."

In the 1940's, Australia undertook serious uranium exploration at the request of the United States, which needed it for its embryonic nuclear weapons program. Later, the country became a leader in the movement to halt nuclear proliferation, and in the 1970's, antinuclear demonstrations drew tens of thousands to the streets in Sydney.

In 1983, the liberal-left Labor Party came to power, and it quickly adopted what became known as a "no new mines" policy. There were three uranium mines in the country at the time, so it also became known as the "three mines only" policy, and it is still in effect.

But perhaps not for much longer.

In the address, on July 17, Mr. Howard declared that Australia could become an "energy superpower." It is already the world's largest exporter of coal, and within a few years is expected to become the second largest supplier of liquefied natural gas, he said.

Then he turned to uranium.

"With close to 40 percent of the world's known low-cost uranium deposits, for Australia to bury its head in the sand on nuclear energy is akin to Saudi Arabia turning her back on global oil developments," Mr. Howard said.

Within the opposition Labor Party, there is fierce division over what the country's nuclear policy should be.

A week after Mr. Howard presented his vision, the Labor Party leader, Kim Beazley, laid out his energy policy. In a speech to the Sydney Institute, a conservative research organization, Mr. Beazley said it was time for the Labor Party to drop its "no new mines" policy.

Mr. Beazley said it was in the national interest to mine more uranium, especially since China was likely to double its demand for Australian uranium in the next 15 years.

Mr. Beazley said he knew his decision would not be popular in his own party, and he was right.

"I will vigorously oppose any watering down of Labor's uranium policy," said the party's environment spokesman, Anthony Albanese. "You can guarantee that uranium mining will lead to nuclear waste. You can't guarantee that uranium mining won't lead to nuclear weapons."

Mr. Beazley was adamant, however, that the Labor Party was still opposed to uranium enrichment.

[http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/02/world/asia/02australia.html?\\_r=1&oref=slogin](http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/02/world/asia/02australia.html?_r=1&oref=slogin)

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New York Times

August 3, 2006

## U.S. Disputes Report On New Pakistan Reactor

By William J. Broad and David E. Sanger

A dispute has broken out between federal officials and a private arms-control group over its claim that a new reactor being built in Pakistan is unusually large and could make fuel for up to 50 nuclear warheads a year.

“We have consulted with our experts and believe the analysis is wrong,” said Frederick Jones, a spokesman for the National Security Council. “The reactor is expected to be substantially smaller and less capable than reported.” A large reactor could foreshadow a significant expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, currently estimated at 40 to 50 nuclear weapons.

The report last week by the private group came amid debate over the Bush administration’s proposed nuclear deal with India and raised fears that Pakistan was trying to speed ahead in a South Asian arms race.

Yesterday, the group’s experts said they stood by their report, which is based mainly on the examination of commercial satellite images of the half-built reactor.

But in interviews, federal officials said their own intelligence indicated that the emerging reactor appeared to be roughly the same size as the small one Pakistan currently uses to make plutonium for its nuclear program, and said the new model might be intended to replace the old one. They spoke on the condition of anonymity because of prohibitions on the public discussion of secretive intelligence issues.

“This has been looked at for a long time and hasn’t generated a lot of hand-wringing,” a senior intelligence official said of the new reactor. “It could be a replacement.”

The episode underscores the uncertainties that often surround nuclear intelligence. In recent years, the government has come under fire for warnings of nuclear dangers that have turned out to be false, most notably in the case of Iraq’s efforts. Critics say the analyses are often subject to political spin.

Pakistan is a major ally of the United States in its effort to prevent terrorism, and Washington might conceivably try to mute criticism of Pakistan’s nuclear program.

But the United States also closely monitors Pakistan’s nuclear work because the government of President Pervez Musharraf is considered the most unstable of any nuclear power — and its relevant facilities are seen as prime targets for Islamic terrorists seeking nuclear weapons.

The reactor dispute began July 24 when the Institute for Science and International Security, based in Washington, issued a report publicly disclosing the reactor’s existence and estimating that, when completed, it would be quite powerful — about 1,000 megawatts. That would be a twentyfold increase over Pakistan’s current plutonium reactor, which arms analysts estimate at 40 to 50 megawatts and able to make fuel for about two warheads a year.

The group’s paper, first reported in The Washington Post, contained many caveats, including that its estimate of the new reactor’s power “remains uncertain.”

The two reactor sites are near each other south of Khushab, Pakistan, and can be seen on Google Earth near 32.015 degrees north latitude and 72.190 east longitude. In the satellite image, the old site is circular, and the new one square.

Both old and new reactors were said to require heavy water, a costly substance. But federal officials, including some specializing in nuclear intelligence, said they had seen no evidence in Pakistan of an ability to make the far larger amounts of heavy water that a big new plutonium reactor would require.

David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, defended the accuracy of his group’s report and noted the Bush administration’s poor record on nuclear intelligence.

“We’re confident in our evidence and calculations,” he said in an interview yesterday. “If the administration wants to produce the reasons it thinks we’re wrong, we’ll be happy to examine them with an open mind.”

Mr. Albright said that the circular reactor vessel of the new Pakistani reactor was clearly visible in satellite photos and that its diameter — about 16 feet — was similar to those of heavy-water reactors at the Savannah River plant in Aiken, S.C. Over the decades, the government used them to make plutonium for many thousands of nuclear arms.

But Thomas B. Cochran, director of the nuclear program at the Natural Resources Defense Council in Washington, a private group that has long monitored atomic developments around the world, said Mr. Albright’s group had apparently misinterpreted the purpose of the circular object.

Rather than a reactor vessel, he said, it probably represented thick rings of metal and concrete shielding meant to block high heat and dangerous radiation from a reactor that will prove to be much smaller.

[http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/03/world/asia/03pakistan.html?\\_r=1&oref=slogin](http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/03/world/asia/03pakistan.html?_r=1&oref=slogin)

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Washington Times

August 4, 2006

Pg. 1

## **No Pakistan Nukes Buildup, Envoy Says**

*Some military use of reactor seen*

By David R. Sands, The Washington Times



A major new Pakistani plutonium nuclear reactor could be used for "military purposes" as well as for civilian power needs but will not lead to a massive increase in the country's nuclear arsenal, Pakistan's new ambassador to Washington said yesterday.

Ambassador Mahmud Ali Durrani dismissed a private Washington-based think tank's report on the reactor under construction at the Khushab nuclear complex as "grossly exaggerated," and denied the new plant could produce enough weapons-grade plutonium to boost the country's production from an estimated two bombs a year to as many as 50.

But in an interview with editors and reporters at The Washington Times, he gave the first official acknowledgment that the heavy-water reactor will bring at least some increase in Pakistan's military nuclear capability at a time of heightened fears of a South Asia arms race with rival India.

"The plutonium may certainly be used for military purposes, but it is simply not the case that it will increase our capability X-fold," said Mr. Durrani, a former top defense adviser to the Pakistani president and chairman of the country's military industrial complex for much of the 1990s.

The ambassador declined to give production figures for the new plant, but said it would be far less powerful than the 1,000-megawatt estimate given last month by the Institute for Science and International Security. Pakistan's current reactor, located near the new one, is a 50-megawatt unit completed in 1998.

"I would love it to be 1,000 megawatts, because we certainly have the power needs," he joked.

But the Khushab site has sparked international concerns as the United States and India move to ratify a nuclear cooperation deal that critics warn could allow India to greatly accelerate its own military nuclear program.

Mr. Durrani, who presented his credentials to President Bush a month ago, said Pakistan had conveyed its "deep concerns" about the India accord to the Bush administration, while saying it was unlikely the deal could be derailed.

"We know your administration is very keen for this deal, but we also don't want to see an imbalance with India that we would have to match," Mr. Durrani said.

He frankly acknowledged that the case of Pakistan nuclear pioneer Abdul Qadeer Khan, who sold sensitive nuclear technology to rogue states such as Iran and North Korea before his smuggling ring was broken up in 2004, was "an absolute, total, unmitigated disaster for my country," raising doubts in Washington and other capitals about the reliability of Pakistan's nonproliferation controls.

"It pulled our image down very badly and it will take us time to get out of this mess," he said.

The Pakistani envoy said he hoped to end what he called the "yo-yo," up-and-down relationship his country has had with the United States.

He rejected suggestions that the Pakistani army and intelligence services are less than fully committed to the war against al Qaeda and global terrorism, saying the military "is perhaps the most liberal institution in the country today."

The army, Mr. Durrani noted, has suffered 600 deaths in the politically difficult campaign to flush out Taliban and al Qaeda operatives in the country's tribal provinces on the border. He said there were signs of rising Islamic fundamentalist activity in the region -- a "blowback" from continuing insecurity across the border in Afghanistan -- but said U.S. and Pakistani officials are planning special reconstruction zones as part of a campaign to undercut the appeal of extremists.

The ambassador said there was "no sympathy" in Pakistan for Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders, but he added it was more likely bin Laden was holed up on the less-populous Afghan side of the border.

"I think if he were in Pakistan, he would be caught by now," he said.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20060803-105552-9457r.htm>

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GovExec.com

DAILY BRIEFING

August 3, 2006

## **Lawmakers may cut nuclear detection office funding**

By Jon Fox, [Global Security Newswire](#)

In the web of agencies working to stop a nuclear weapon from creeping across the border or being carried off a ship at one of the nation's ports, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is somewhere near the center.

As officials often put it, the office is in charge of developing a nuclear detection "architecture," -- essentially a strategy for global deployment of nuclear detectors -- but responsibility for implementing that plan sprawls across a network of government agencies, including the FBI and the Defense, Energy, Justice and State departments.

However, some lawmakers have questioned the office's ability to coordinate the deployment of that plan. The Senate Appropriations Committee in June recommended withholding \$80 million in "research, development and

operations" from fiscal 2007 Homeland Security Department funding until an agreement is reached between all the agencies involved in nuclear detection regarding their responsibilities. The detection office itself is part of the Homeland Security Department.

The committee expressed concern that "DNDO lacks the ability to ensure these agencies will follow through with their role in this architecture." In addition, the committee recommended cutting more than \$93 million from the president's \$535 million budget request for the office.

That includes all fiscal 2007 funding -- more than \$65 million -- for a grant program designed to put the nation's research universities to work on the problems of nuclear detection. The committee said the program too closely mirrored an existing initiative within Homeland Security's Science and Technology Office.

Lawmakers also cut \$18 million from a program to enhance detection of shielded plutonium or uranium, due to earlier delays in the program's inception.

The committee also halved the office's \$17 million nuclear forensic budget, noting that the FBI and the detection office jointly manage the nuclear attribution program. If the FBI shares management of the program, it should also contribute funding, the committee report recommends.

Director Vayl Oxford last week said cuts to his office's research budget could hamper efforts to develop next-generation nuclear detectors.

The academic research program cut by the Senate is "the future for this country for this area," Oxford said during a Senate Judiciary subcommittee hearing. The cuts "will hurt our ability to get the universities and colleges engaged in this topic, to bring the best and brightest to the forefront."

"We need to work with the Senate in the conference process to see if we can restore that," Oxford said.

A House version of the same appropriations bill reduces funding by \$35 million to \$500 million. The House Appropriations Committee removed funding for the office's "surge" program. The program was designed to provide federal, state and local law enforcement with rapidly deployable equipment for nuclear detection during periods of heightened threat conditions.

The House also trimmed research funding request from \$100 million to \$85 million. While the White House request would have represented a 70-percent increase over fiscal 2006 DNDO funding levels, the House bill still bumps up the office's budget by nearly 60 percent.

Unlike the Senate committee, which expressed concerns about the detection office's ability to get related agencies to implement its architecture, the House committee included a dose of praise in its appropriation report.

"The committee is impressed with the aggressive efforts and focus of this new organization. Though only a year old, DNDO has provided timely and accurate information, worked with Congress to clarify its important mission, and appears well on its way to greatly expanding domestic capability for detection of illicit nuclear materials."

Such an assessment is slightly at odds with a March report from the Government Accountability Office. The report called Homeland Security's review process for providing requested information to Congress "cumbersome," noting that it has resulted in funds being available later than expected.

The delay in funding, in turn, has resulted in a delayed deployment of radiation detectors at U.S. ports of entry.

The report also called Homeland Security's planned schedule to install more than 3,000 radiation detectors by 2009 at a cost of \$1.3 billion "highly uncertain."

#### **A New Office**

The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office officially began operations on April 15, 2005. However, discussions on the new agency had begun nearly a year earlier in May 2004.

"It was understood that to effectively combat the threat of smuggled nuclear weapons the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy and the Department of Homeland Security had to be better organized," said Jonah Czerwinski, a senior researcher with the Center for the Study of the Presidency.

There were, in essence, two questions at the core of the issue: Are we at the limits of physics or the limits of technology in detecting the presence of smuggled nuclear material? Also, are the various agencies involved set up in the best way to prevent nuclear smuggling?

"The answer to the second question was a resounding 'no,'" Czerwinski said. The Center for the Study of the Presidency acted as a catalyst for the new office, conducting round table discussions and bringing together officials from the executive branch and experts from outside government, Czerwinski said.

Involved in these discussions were then-Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge, staffers for Vice President Dick Cheney's office and personnel from the U.S. national laboratories. Norman Augustine, then chairman of the board for defense contractor Lockheed Martin, led the meetings.

The goal was to create a truly comprehensive solution to detecting smuggled nuclear material, one that extended well beyond Homeland Security. That meant addressing the problem across all phases of "an adversary's activities, including motivation, planning, delivery and exploitation," according to notes from the first meeting.



"The purpose was to elevate this issue so it doesn't become just another element of bureaucracy or another budget line," Czerwinski said. The program meant looking beyond just the challenges of detection and examining how existing programs were working together, he said.

By the end of 2004, Deputy Homeland Security Secretary James Loy was ready to take the idea of this new coordinating agency to the White House, Czerwinski said.

"We started meeting with the vice president," he said. In January 2005, Czerwinski and Loy met with Cheney, his then-national security affairs assistant Lewis Libby and other members of the vice presidential staff. "For about an hour we went over some of the concepts in play."

The agency's first appellation was the National Domestic Nuclear Defense Office, a name that seems to reflect the broad vision sketched out in the 2004 discussions.

It was not always assumed that this new office would fall within the Homeland Security Department. There were discussions of housing it in the Defense Department or within the White House, Czerwinski said.

When the office found a home at Homeland Security, however, the name shifted. "Defense means something, and it means something that DOD owns," Czerwinski said.

Once the office's parent department was known, Czerwinski said, there was a struggle to ensure that it reported directly to the secretary and that it was not lumped together with the department's Science and Technology Office.

The new office was to spearhead the aggressive pursuit and deployment of new detection technology, but also had a broader mission. It was designed to be an interagency "hub," Czerwinski said.

In addition to drafting a "global detection architecture," the office was designed to serve as a "focal point" to coordinate nuclear detection efforts within the executive branch, Oxford said last week.

Detection efforts were receiving little attention before 2005, said former DNDO deputy chief Mike Carter. As notes from the 2004 round-table session describe it, "basic research needed to improve the sensing and detecting capabilities of smuggled radiological and nuclear material remain stovepiped" across the executive branch and the agencies involved.

Before the detection office's inception "research and development capabilities were what I would call way underfunded," Carter said. "Investment in radiation detection had gone to almost nothing."

The various agencies involved were, in part, "warring factions," Carter said. Those were problems Oxford's agency was designed to ameliorate by bringing together an interagency staff.

"It was partly a government social experiment," Carter said.

Before the office was formalized, Homeland Security funding for acquisition of detectors and research and development totaled about \$173 million in 2005. The office is operating with a \$315 million budget this fiscal year. While it remains to be seen if it will receive the \$535 million requested for fiscal 2007, Oxford told the Senate subcommittee, "We are on the right trajectory."

The additional funding has been directed to research activities and the deployment of radiation detectors at the nation's ports.

With support from Congress and the White House, Oxford expects the office budget to crack \$1 billion in about five years.

From five or six federal employees about 18 months ago, the office is projected to have more than 100 next year, Carter said.

Governmental and independent critics, however, have questioned just how well the agencies have been brought together, and the proposed Senate funding cuts seem to reflect some of those questions.

The office's mission, has been defined a number of times in a number of different ways, said Michael Levi, a nuclear terrorism expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. Lawmakers might be asking, in effect, just what the agency does.

"I suspect that the funding cuts may have been made in part to send the signal that Congress needs more information," Levi said.

"Key parts of Congress appear to have different ideas of what DNDO's mission is, and those sometime differ from how DNDO defines its mission itself. That's problematic," he said.

Referring to the laudatory language in the House appropriations bill, Levi sees a conception of an office with a purely domestic scope, but the language used by Oxford and others speaks to something broader than that.

"DNDO talks about a 'global architecture,' which is a great goal, but that's different from domestic detection," Levi said.

Czerwinski said the Senate's budget figures are disheartening, and the demand for memoranda of agreement between the detection office and the other agencies involved might represent a fundamental misunderstanding of what the office was designed to do.

It was created to be a "focal point" of the interagency community, he said. The office is as much a part of Homeland Security as it is a part of the Defense, Energy or Justice departments, Czerwinski said. All those agencies have staff members working side by side with Oxford, making memoranda of agreement are superfluous. However, he acknowledged that the conception of the office as a functioning point of interagency cooperation might not match the reality.

"The jury's still out," he said. "Ideally that's the way it's supposed to be, but it's still so young."

[http://govexec.com/story\\_page.cfm?articleid=34707&dcn=todaysnews](http://govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=34707&dcn=todaysnews)

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International Herald Tribune

August 5, 2006

## Seoul Moves To Retract Warning About Missile

By Choe Sang-Hun

SEOUL--South Korea appeared to back down Friday from its earlier assessment that North Korea may have a second Taepodong-2 ballistic missile ready for launching, after a test early last month alarmed its neighbors and prompted United Nations sanctions.

Defense Minister Yoon Kwang Ung of South Korea had told the National Assembly last month that Pyongyang might have moved two long-range Taepodong-2 missiles to a launching pad at Musudan-ri, North Korea. Officials suspect one of the missiles was test-fired July 5.

But South Korean officials said Friday that North Korea may have removed the second missile - if it was ever there - lowering the likelihood of further tests.

"We have never confirmed whether there was a second missile at the launch site," said an official at the South Korean Defense Ministry, speaking on condition of anonymity.

American and South Korean officials considered the July 5 launching a failure because the missile disintegrated soon after take-off. Officials and experts have since speculated that North Korea may fire a second missile after fixing technical glitches.

Experts say that the Taepodong-2 missile is designed with a range long enough to strike Alaska.

Washington and Tokyo, seeking to put international pressure on the Pyongyang regime, seized on the July 5 test to get a UN Security Council resolution passed that banned UN members from any dealings with Pyongyang that could help it build or deliver weapons of mass destruction.

North Korea has vowed to test more missiles.

A South Korean government-run research institute Thursday issued a report saying North Korea and Iran have cooperated on the development of their respective Taepodong-2 and Shehab-5 missiles, possibly employing technology from China.

"The development of Taepodong-2 is conducted jointly with Iran, and it is possible China's technology is used in the development of the Taepodong-2 engine," said the report, published by the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security in Seoul.

North Korea also has been building underground missile bases along its east coast, deploying Rodong and SSN-6 missiles that are aimed at Japan and U.S. military facilities in Japan, the report said.

North Korea, which Washington calls one of the worst proliferators of missile technology, earns \$150 million a year from its missile sales, the institute said, citing no sources. The North has sold Scud and Rodong missiles to Iran, Libya, Syria, Egypt, Pakistan, Yemen, Vietnam and Sudan, it said.

### North open to Seoul's help

North Korea urgently needs food after heavy floods devastated the isolated communist nation and is willing to accept aid from the South Korean government, a North Korean official was quoted as saying Friday, The Associated Press reported from Seoul.

"The most pressing thing for now is to address the issue of eating," Kim Song Won, head of the North's Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Committee, told the South Korean Yonhap news agency.

Floods that began in mid-July wreaked havoc on many parts of the North. A South Korean activist group has claimed that the disaster left about 10,000 people dead or missing.

North Korea had been unwilling to accept flood-related aid from the South Korean government in apparent anger at Seoul's decision to suspend aid to its impoverished neighbor over the North's missile launching last month.

Pyongyang also rejected an aid offer from the South's Red Cross earlier this week.

<http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/08/04/news/korea.php>

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## **Pakistani Reactor Not As Significant As Was Reported, Administration Says**

By Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer

Days after it confirmed the existence of a partially completed heavy-water reactor in central Pakistan, the administration took steps this week to play down the significance of the project, saying the new facility will produce far less plutonium than initial reports indicated.

That stance puts the administration in conflict with independent nuclear experts over that crucial question and what the answer means for South Asia's nuclear arms race.

The nuclear analysts who brought the reactor to light stood by their conclusion that the reactor would dramatically boost Pakistan's capacity to develop plutonium-based warheads. Pakistan is believed to possess fewer than 50 warheads, all of them based on highly enriched uranium. Uranium-based bombs are heavier and harder to mount on missiles.

"We are confident that this is a large reactor vessel," said David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, a Washington nonprofit group that assesses the capabilities and weapons stockpiles of nuclear states.

The ISIS report, described in a July 24 Washington Post report, was based on an assessment of satellite photos of the reactor, which is inside a Pakistani nuclear complex that already has a small reactor for producing plutonium. The scale of the facility under construction suggests a powerful heavy-water reactor with a capacity of at least 1,000 megawatts thermal and a maximum annual plutonium output of 200 kilograms, enough for 40 to 50 warheads, ISIS said.

The report warned of the possibility of a new round of nuclear competition between Pakistan and India, which both possess the bomb.

Administration officials, citing government intelligence and nuclear experts, said the ISIS estimate was off the mark. They offered few specifics, saying the government's analysis remained classified.

"The reactor will be over 10 times less capable" than the ISIS report's estimates, State Department spokesman Edgar Matthews said. Matthews acknowledged that Pakistan appears to be diversifying its ability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons, and noted that the new reactor would not be subject to international monitoring and inspection.

Yesterday, a spokesman for the Pakistani government echoed the administration's position, saying the reactor's annual output would be significantly less than 200 kilograms of plutonium.

"The capacity has been highly exaggerated," said M. Akram Shaheedi, press minister for Pakistan Embassy. He acknowledged that Pakistan is was modernizing its nuclear program to "maintain a credible nuclear deterrent."

In a statement posted on the group's Web site, ISIS defended its analysis and offered additional detail on how it reached its conclusions. A key factor, the group said, was the size of the reactor vessel under construction, which ISIS described as much larger than the modest plutonium-production reactor Pakistan has operated since 1998. ISIS said the new reactor is comparable in size to reactor vessels at the Savannah River nuclear site, which for decades produced plutonium for the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Those large reactors began operation in the 1950s at 500 to 1,000 megawatts each, but were increased in power over several years to 2,000 megawatts.

"It is true that someone can operate at less than maximum power, but the capacity is there," Albright said in an interview. "The reactor gives Pakistan the ability to step up the power of the reactor over time, regardless of what the nameplate power of the reactor is now."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/04/AR2006080401613.html>

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## **U.S. Puts Sanctions On 7 Foreign Companies Dealing With Iran**

By Helene Cooper and Steven Lee Myers

WASHINGTON, Aug. 4 — The United States has imposed sanctions on seven foreign companies, two of them Russian, for providing Iran with materials that could be used to make unconventional weapons or cruise or ballistic missile systems, it was announced Friday.

The sanctions, effective July 28, will be in place for two years. During that time, American government agencies are not allowed to buy goods or services from the seven companies or provide them with assistance. The sanctions also bar the sale of some military equipment, services or technologies to the companies or their subsidiaries.

The two Russian companies are Rosoboronexport, the state-owned arms trading monopoly, and Sukhoi, a large manufacturer of military and civilian aircraft.

Also affected by the sanctions are the Korean Mining and Industrial Development Corporation and Korea Pugang Trading Corporation, both of North Korea; one Cuban company, the Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology; and two Indian companies, Prachi Poly Products and Balaji Amines.

The sanctions were imposed by the State Department under the Iran Nonproliferation Act, passed by Congress in 2000. The announcement brings to 33 the number of foreign companies penalized under the law.

Russia's Foreign Ministry responded swiftly and harshly, calling the decision unacceptable and denying that the country's military trade with Iran had violated any international laws.

"In effect, it amounts to one more unjustifiable attempt to force foreign companies to base their activities on American domestic regulations," the ministry said in a statement released on Friday evening in Moscow. "Sanctions of this kind that the United States unilaterally applies to other countries and to organizations in them are an obvious political and legal anachronism, especially when such moves are made under far-fetched pretexts."

On Monday, Russia joined the United States, Britain, France, China and other members of the United Nations Security Council in passing a resolution giving Iran until the end of this month to suspend its enrichment of uranium or face sanctions.

A senior Bush administration official, questioned about the timing of the sanctions announced Friday, given that the United States is trying to hold the Russians in a coalition to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions, said that "there's never a good time" to impose sanctions. "They know the law," he added.

The official asked that he not be identified because he was not authorized to speak publicly on the issue.

Late last year, Russia signed an agreement to ship \$1 billion in weaponry to Iran. The agreement includes the sale of Tor-M1 air defense missiles, but the deal has not yet been completed, according to Russian news reports.

An official at Sukhoi expressed puzzlement, saying the company had worked closely with American companies and had not sold anything to Iran in recent years. Sukhoi has been working with Boeing on a joint venture to develop a regional passenger airliner, but it is not clear whether that project will be affected.

"We have been on the U.S. market for a long time," Sukhoi's deputy director, Aleksandr N. Klementyev, said in a radio interview Friday evening on Ekho Moskv. "We study the legislation very attentively, and we have never violated anything, nor are we going to."

John Dern, a spokesman for Boeing, said his company was "reviewing the sanctions to assure that we'll be in full compliance with their requirements." Boeing serves in an advisory role in Sukhoi Civil Aircraft's plan to develop a regional jet called Superjet 100, he said.

The plane, which seats 100, is supposed to make its first flight in September 2007. It would compete with regional jets built by Embraer, a Brazilian company, and Bombardier, of Quebec.

The Russian Foreign Ministry's statement suggested that the sanctions could hurt American companies. "In effect, the United States punishes its own companies, depriving them of the opportunity to cooperate with advanced Russian enterprises," the statement said.

It did not address the debate over how to respond to Iran's nuclear programs, but it called the American step "shortsighted" and said it was "bound to affect the quality of our cooperation" with the United States.

*Helene Cooper reported from Washington for this article, and Steven Lee Myers from Moscow. Matthew L. Wald contributed reporting from Washington.*

<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/05/world/middleeast/05sanctions.html>

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London Sunday Times

August 6, 2006

## **Iran's Plot To Mine Uranium In Africa**

By Jon Swain, David Leppard and Brian Johnson-Thomas

IRAN is seeking to import large consignments of bomb-making uranium from the African mining area that produced the Hiroshima bomb, an investigation has revealed.

A United Nations report, dated July 18, said there was "no doubt" that a huge shipment of smuggled uranium 238, uncovered by customs officials in Tanzania, was transported from the Lubumbashi mines in the Congo.

Tanzanian customs officials told The Sunday Times it was destined for the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, and was stopped on October 22 last year during a routine check.

The disclosure will heighten western fears about the extent of Iran's presumed nuclear weapons programme and the strategic implications of Iran's continuing support for Hezbollah during the war with Israel.

It has also emerged that terror cells backed by Iran may be prepared to mount attacks against nuclear power plants in Britain. Intelligence circulating in Whitehall suggests that sleeper cells linked to Tehran have been conducting reconnaissance at some nuclear sites in preparation for a possible attack.

The parliamentary intelligence and security committee has reported that Iran represented one of the three biggest security threats to Britain. The UN security council has given Iran until the end of this month to halt its uranium enrichment activities. The UN has threatened sanctions if Tehran fails to do so.

A senior Tanzanian customs official said the illicit uranium shipment was found hidden in a consignment of coltan, a rare mineral used to make chips in mobile telephones. The shipment was destined for smelting in the former Soviet republic of Kazakhstan, delivered via Bandar Abbas, Iran's biggest port.

"There were several containers due to be shipped and they were all routinely scanned with a Geiger counter," the official said.

"This one was very radioactive. When we opened the container it was full of drums of coltan. Each drum contains about 50kg of ore. When the first and second rows were removed, the ones after that were found to be drums of uranium."

In a nuclear reactor, uranium 238 can be used to breed plutonium used in nuclear weapons.

The customs officer, who spoke to The Sunday Times on condition he was not named, added: "The container was put in a secure part of the port and it was later taken away, by the Americans, I think, or at least with their help. We have all been told not to talk to anyone about this."

The report by the UN investigation team was submitted to the chairman of the UN sanctions committee, Oswaldo de Rivero, at the end of July and will be considered soon by the security council.

It states that Tanzania provided "limited data" on three other shipments of radioactive materials seized in Dar es Salaam over the past 10 years.

The experts said: "In reference to the last shipment from October 2005, the Tanzanian government left no doubt that the uranium was transported from Lubumbashi by road through Zambia to the united republic of Tanzania."

Lubumbashi is the capital of mineral-rich Katanga province, home of the Shinkolobwe uranium mine that produced material for the two atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.

The mine has officially been closed since 1961, before the country's independence from Belgium, but the UN investigators have told the security council that they found evidence of illegal mining still going on at the site.

In 1999 there were reports that the Congolese authorities had tried to re-open the mine with the help of North Korea. In recent years miners are said to have broken open the lids and extracted ore from the shafts, while police and local authorities turned a blind eye.

In June a parliamentary committee warned that Britain could be attacked by Iranian terrorists if tensions increased.

A source with access to current MI5 assessments said: "There is great concern about Iranian sleeper cells inside this country. The intelligence services are taking this threat very seriously."

<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-2300772.html>

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Washington Times

August 6, 2006

Pg. B3

## Missile Launch Lessons

By James Hackett

North Korea's launch of seven ballistic missiles, six them over four hours on the Fourth of July, gave us some useful lessons: confirmation that appeasement does not work and defenses are a good thing, and more are needed.

When North Korea's launch preparations were seen by satellite, the whole world pleaded with Pyongyang not to break the missile flight test moratorium it had observed since 1999. Restraint would be rewarded with aid and benefits, at least from South Korea. But to no avail. North Korea went ahead with the most impressive series of peacetime missile launches ever seen.

Appeasement did not work, but neither did threats. Former Clinton era defense officials William Perry and Ashton Carter suggested a pre-emptive strike by cruise missiles to destroy the North's long-range Taepodong missile on its launch pad. If this provocative suggestion was meant to cow North Korea, it did not. Instead, Pyongyang justified its actions by accusing the U.S. of planning to attack.

Intelligence analysts say North Korea launched three Scuds, three Nodongs, and one Taepodong-2 (TD-2) in a single day. Some were observed or tracked by satellites, radars in Japan, RC-135 electronic reconnaissance aircraft

and by U.S. and Japanese Aegis destroyers. The three-stage TD-2 exploded after 42 seconds and fell into the sea. It appeared heading across northern Japan to splash down in the Pacific somewhere between Japan and the Hawaiian Islands.

In its 1998 Taepodong-1 launch, North Korea showed it had solved the formidable engineering challenge of building a multistage missile. This time, it did not work. But the six shorter-range missiles did. Four landed in the same area of the Sea of Japan, suggesting improved accuracy. The sixth and seventh appear to be new extended-range Scud-ERs with up to double the range of the 300-mile Scud-C.

North Korea already operates the 800-mile Nodong, which can reach most of Japan. While a new 600-mile missile also could reach parts of Japan, its main purpose likely is to hold at risk all of South Korea, including U.S. bases, from launch-sites near the Chinese and Russian borders that would be hard to attack.

The TD-2 failure provides small comfort. North Korea's continuing missile and nuclear weapon developments, with the help of Iran and others, endangers a large part of the Western Pacific. Japanese press reports claim 10 Iranian observers were at the North Korean launches. And a recent analysis of North Korea's nuclear weapons program indicates it now has enough separated plutonium for from four to 13 nuclear weapons, and could have much more in just a few years.

U.S. bases in South Korea and Japan already are under the gun. Deployment of Patriot PAC-3 missile interceptors to Kadena Air Force Base on Okinawa has been speeded up to begin this month. And the Aegis cruiser USS Shiloh, which carries SM-3 missile interceptors for flight tests, is on its way to Japan. Washington and Tokyo are discussing possibly accelerating shipment of both PAC-3s for deployment near Tokyo and SM-3s to be carried on Japan's Aegis destroyers.

The Missile Defense Agency is equipping 18 U.S. Aegis cruisers and destroyers with missile-tracking radar and SM-3 interceptors, 56 to be on board by 2008. A new high-speed interceptor known as SM-3 Block 2 is being developed jointly by the U.S. and Japan, which will enable Aegis ships of both countries to intercept longer-range missiles in the ascent phase. Despite its promise, the Block 2 model is not expected to be operational until 2015. The TD-2 launch shows the importance of defending our 50th state. It may not have the range to reach Hawaii, but North Korea and Iran are working on one that will. To defend against such missiles the U.S. will have 13 interceptors in Alaska and two in California by year's end. Since two interceptors will be fired at each missile, that is a real threat: To increase the odds of an intercept, a total of two obviously is insufficient. Hawaii also can be defended from California, so the missile defenses there should be increased from two interceptors to at least 10 or 12.

One lesson from North Korea's missile launches is that more and better defenses are needed in the Pacific. As it completes action on the 2007 defense budget, Congress should consider buying more SM-3 ship-based interceptors, speed development of the SM-3 Block 2, and order 10 more ground-based interceptors to be based in California.

*James Hackett is a contributing writer to The Washington Times and is based in Carlsbad, Calif.*

<http://www.washtimes.com/commentary/20060805-105035-7719r.htm>

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Washington Times

August 7, 2006

Pg. 1

## **Hezbollah Attacks Seen As Iran Diversion**

By Rowan Scarborough, The Washington Times

Hezbollah's July 12 attack on Israel is seen by some Bush administration officials as a bid to break the West's unified focus on forcing Iran to stop enriching uranium for use in nuclear weapons.

Hezbollah, which is financed and trained by Iran's Revolutionary Guards, struck on the very day the six powers -- five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, plus Germany -- met in Paris to discuss the next move after Iran refused to stop its enrichment program. It came days before the Group of Eight summit in Russia, at which President Bush lobbied for a tough stance against Iran's militant regime, which has threatened to destroy Israel.

"It was to try to divert attention from Iran's nuke program," said a senior administration official, when asked why Hezbollah forces based in Lebanon chose that date to launch an attack inside Israel that killed three Israeli soldiers and kidnapped two others. Asked how the U.S. knows this, the official declined to comment.

A second senior official also said the attack appeared to be an attempt to shake Europe's alliance with the U.S. on preventing Iranian nukes. The official said there is no hard evidence that Iran specifically triggered the assault.

A U.S. intelligence official, who asked not to be named, said it is not clear exactly why Hezbollah chose that moment in time to execute such a provocative act. The official said it may have been an attempt to force Israel to exchange Israeli-held Hezbollah fighters for the two Israeli soldiers. The official declined to discuss Iran.



Iran's chief nuclear negotiator is Ali Larijani, a hard-line former Revolutionary Guard leader who now serves as secretary of the country's Supreme National Security Council.

Mr. Larijani met July 11 in Europe with Javier Solana, the European Union's foreign representative. Mr. Larijani rejected Western offers of inducements to end enrichment. A spokesman said Mr. Solana was "disappointed" in the talks.

The next day, Mr. Larijani appeared in Damascus on Syrian TV meeting with President Bashar Assad, another Hezbollah backer. His regime allows shipments of Iranian arms and rockets to pass through its territory into southern Lebanon.

The Iran-Syria-Hezbollah strategy does not appear to be working, administration officials say.

For one, the U.N. Security Council voted last Monday to express "serious concern" and said Iran had until Aug. 31 to stop enrichment or face sanctions.

Secondly, Bush officials say Hezbollah underestimated Israel's response. Rather than a tit-for-tat retaliation, Israel immediately launched a full-scale war on Hezbollah. Using advanced U.S. strike aircraft and precision munitions, it has unleashed relentless round-the-clock attacks against Hezbollah's command centers, homes, communications networks, Al Manar television station and arms caches. On the ground, the Israelis contend they have cleansed over 20 southern Lebanese villages of Hezbollah fighters.

The U.S. intelligence official said Hezbollah "miscalculated and clearly did not anticipate the events it provoked."

In the end, Bush administration officials say Hezbollah will never be able to re-establish itself in southern Lebanon, where it had turned the mountainous terrain into a network of command centers, garrisons and arms caches from which to lob some of its 13,000 rockets into Israeli population centers.

Hezbollah has been on the U.S. target list since al Qaeda's September 11, 2001, attacks. While not directly tied to the Sunni al Qaeda, the Shi'ite-dominated Hezbollah has attacked and killed Americans, vows to destroy Israel and advocates an Iranian-style theocracy established in Beirut.

Now, Israel is doing something Washington has wanted done for years.

"Hezbollah may be the 'A-Team of Terrorists' and maybe al Qaeda is actually the 'B-Team.' And they're on the list, and their time will come," then-Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said in 2003. "There is no question about it. It's all in good time. And we're going to go after these problems just like a high school wrestler goes after a match. We're going to take them down one at a time."

Administration officials have said the Israeli Defense Forces is overstating the damage its attacks have inflicted on Hezbollah's sizable arsenal. Still, they say, the militant group is being damaged.

"They have dealt Hezbollah some significant blows to date; but that said, they have a very large stockpile of rockets and formidable logistics operations, having been in the country for so long," the U.S. intelligence official said.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20060807-124415-3153r.htm>

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Philadelphia Inquirer

August 7, 2006

Pg. 1

## **Weapons Of Mass... Confusion**

By Charles J. Hanley, Associated Press

Did Saddam Hussein's government have weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in 2003?

Half of America apparently still thinks so, a new poll finds, and experts see a raft of reasons: a drumbeat of voices from talk radio to die-hard bloggers to the Oval Office, a surprise headline here or there, a rallying around a partisan flag, and a growing need for people, in their own minds, to justify the war in Iraq.

People tend to become "independent of reality" in these circumstances, opinion analyst Steven Kull said.

The reality is that after a 16-month, \$900-million-plus investigation, the U.S. weapons hunters known as the Iraq Survey Group declared that Iraq had dismantled its chemical, biological and nuclear arms programs in 1991 under U.N. oversight. That finding in 2004 reaffirmed the work of U.N. inspectors who, in 2002-03, found no trace of banned arsenals in Iraq.

Despite that, a Harris Poll released July 21 found that 50 percent of U.S. respondents - up from 36 percent last year - said they believed Iraq did have the forbidden arms when U.S. troops invaded in March 2003, an attack whose stated purpose was elimination of supposed WMD. Other polls also have found an enduring American faith in the WMD story.

"I'm flabbergasted," said Michael Massing, a media critic whose writings dissected the largely unquestioning U.S. news reporting on the Bush administration's shaky WMD claims in 2002-03.

"This finding just has to cause despair among those of us who hope for an informed public able to draw reasonable conclusions based on evidence," Massing said.

Timing may explain some of the poll results. Two weeks before the survey, two Republican lawmakers, Sen. Rick Santorum of Pennsylvania and Rep. Peter Hoekstra of Michigan, released an intelligence report in Washington saying 500 chemical munitions had been collected in Iraq since the 2003 invasion.

"I think the Harris Poll was measuring people's surprise at hearing this after being told for so long there were no WMD in the country," said Hoekstra spokesman Jamal Ware.

But the Pentagon and outside experts stressed that those abandoned shells, many found in ones and twos, were 15 years old or more, their chemical contents were degraded, and they were unusable as artillery ordnance. Since the 1990s, such "orphan" munitions, from among 160,000 made by Iraq and destroyed, have turned up on old battlefields and elsewhere in Iraq, former inspectors say. In other words, this was no surprise.

"These are not stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction," said Scott Ritter, the Marine veteran who was a U.N. inspector in the 1990s. "They weren't deliberately withheld from inspectors by the Iraqis."

Conservative commentator Deroy Murdock, who trumpeted Hoekstra's announcement in his syndicated column, complained in an interview that the press "didn't give the story the play it deserved." But in some quarters it was headlined.

"Our top story tonight, the nation abuzz today... " was how Fox News led its report on the old, stray shells. Talk-radio hosts and their callers seized on it. Feedback to blogs grew intense. "Americans are waking up from a distorted reality," read one posting.

Other claims about supposed WMD had preceded this, especially speculation since 2003 that Iraq had secretly shipped WMD abroad. A former Iraqi general's book - at best uncorroborated hearsay - claimed "56 flights" by jetliners had borne such material to Syria.

But Kull, Massing and others see an influence on opinion that's more sustained than the odd headline.

"I think the Santorum-Hoekstra thing is the latest 'factoid,' but the basic dynamic is the insistent repetition by the Bush administration of the original argument," said John Prados, author of the 2004 book *Hoodwinked: The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War*.

Administration statements still describe Hussein's Iraq as a threat. Despite the official findings, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has allowed only that "perhaps" WMD weren't in Iraq.

And Bush himself, since 2003, has repeatedly insisted on one plainly false point: that Hussein rebuffed the U.N. inspectors in 2002, that "he wouldn't let them in," as he said in 2003, and "he chose to deny inspectors," as he said this March.

The facts are that Iraq - after a four-year hiatus in cooperating with inspections - acceded to the U.N. Security Council's demand and allowed scores of experts to conduct more than 700 inspections of potential weapons sites from Nov. 27, 2002, to March 16, 2003. The inspectors said they could wrap up their work within months. Instead, the U.S. invasion aborted that work.

As recently as May 27, Bush told West Point graduates, "When the United Nations Security Council gave him one final chance to disclose and disarm, or face serious consequences, he refused to take that final opportunity."

"Which isn't true," observed Kathleen Hall Jamieson, a scholar of presidential rhetoric at the University of Pennsylvania. But "it doesn't surprise me when presidents reconstruct reality to make their policies defensible." This president may even have convinced himself it's true, she said.

<http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/15214476.htm>

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New York Times

August 7, 2006

## **Iran Says It Will Ignore U.N. Deadline On Uranium Program**

By Michael Slackman

CAIRO, Aug. 6 — Iran's chief national security official said Sunday that Iran would defy the United Nations Security Council by refusing to halt enrichment of uranium by the end of the month.

During a news conference in Iran, Ali Larijani, the country's security chief and top nuclear negotiator, condemned the West. He said it had engaged in double-dealing, by first offering a package of incentives in exchange for suspension of its nuclear-enrichment program, and then by issuing a threat.

In remarks reported by the official Iranian News Agency, Mr. Larijani did not appear to chart new ground, sticking with Iran's position that it would not halt enrichment as a precondition of negotiations.

Western diplomats in Iran said in recent interviews that it appeared that Iran's leadership had bet on the notion that it was more likely to get what it wanted if it refused to budge from its position, believing that the Security Council, and the West in particular, would do anything to avoid another ugly confrontation in the Middle East. The remarks appeared to be consistent with the government's initial reaction at the end of July, when the Security Council passed a resolution demanding that Iran halt its enrichment work or face the possibility of economic and political sanctions.

"The resolution is illegal," said Mr. Larijani, echoing comments made in July by Javad Zarif, Iran's ambassador to the United Nations. The two have said that since Iran has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and since it has not violated that treaty, it cannot be forced to suspend enrichment.

Under the treaty, members are entitled access to peaceful nuclear energy. Iran hid its nuclear program for more than a dozen years from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the nuclear monitoring arm of the United Nations, and now the United States and Europe contend that Iran is pursuing an arms program. Iran insists it is pursuing peaceful nuclear energy.

The United States and Europe offered the incentives in June. Iran had said it would look favorably on the package and give a reply by Aug. 22. The West, along with Russia and China, pushed Iran to reply sooner. When it did not, the Security Council adopted the resolution with the Aug. 31 deadline.

"If they are to solve the problem, they should find a solution in fair negotiations," the news agency quoted Mr. Larijani as saying. "They should not harm the course of the negotiation."

Mr. Larijani did not say what Iran's response would be to the incentive package, only that it was being viewed less favorably after the Security Council resolution.

Christina Gallach, spokeswoman for Javier Solana, the European Union's foreign policy chief, called on Iran to carry out the Security Council resolution. "We encourage Larijani and Iran to comply with the resolution," she said, adding that Iran had ample time to make its case before the resolution was passed.

In Iran, the issue of its nuclear program has become intertwined with the rest of the turmoil in the Middle East. Western diplomats in Iran said it appeared that the chaos had given an upper hand to the more hard-line members of Iran's leadership.

*Dan Bilefsky contributed reporting from Brussels for this article.*

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